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ABSTRACT Destination Advertisement Objects (DAOs) are sent upward by RPL nodes toward the DODAG
root, to build the downward routing paths carrying traffic from the root to its associated nodes. This routing
mechanism can be exploited by a malicious node periodically transmitting a large volume of DAOmessages
towards its parent, which in turn will forward such messages to its own parent and so on, until they arrive at
the Direction-Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG) root. This ultimately results in a negative effect
on network performance in terms of energy consumption, latency and reliability. The first objective of this
paper is to evaluate the effect of such a DAO attack in the context of an RPL IoT network. In particular,
identifying the particular performance metrics and network resources affected most greatly. The second
objective is the proposal of mitigating security mechanisms in relation to DAO attacks and to evaluate their
effectiveness. The simulation results have shown how the attack can damage the network performance by
significantly increasing the DAO overhead and power consumption. It also demonstrated that the DAO attack
affect the reliability of the downward traffic under specific conditions. The proposed mechanisms showed
a good capacity in restoring the optimal performance of the network by up to 205%, 181%, 87% and 6%,
in terms of overhead, latency, power consumption and packet delivery ratio respectively.
INDEX TERMS Internet of Things, low power and lossy networks, security in RPL, DAO attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a generic term used to describe
network devices and things that are interconnected. This term
often falls in the context of high-performance smartphones,
tablet computers and small devices equipped with a tailored
transmission technology as a basis for communication. The
communication between said devices is subject to restrictions
on the performance of nodes that have limited computing
power and resources [1]. To cater for such limited resources,
the Routing Over Low-power and Lossy Networks (RoLL)
working group of the IETF investigated the capacity of com-
mon routing protocols to satisfy the routing requirements of
the Low-power and Lossy Network (LLN). The group finally
reached the conclusion that such can meet the special routing
requirements of LLN, and, hence, introducing what they
named as the Routing Protocol for Low power and Lossy Net-
works (RPL) [2], [3].The security features of RPL have been
investigated extensively in research, indicating that there are
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some security issues that must be addressed to enable wider
adoption of the protocol [4]–[14]. A vital security concern
is the DAO (Destination Advertisement Object) attack. This
attack functions with the adversary node regularly advertising
false DAO messages to its parent nodes, leading to network
resource exhaustion as the parent will attempt to update
the routing table by flooding the network with the received
DAO messages. Thus, the attack will lead to an increase
on processing power required to complete the routing table
update and the DAOs transmission to parent nodes. Another
factor that increases the effectiveness of the attack is that in
RPL under storing mode the transmission of DAO messages
follows the upward direction towards the sink, and thus the
scope of damage increases beyond area of the attacker node
[3], [15]. These consequences downgrade the network perfor-
mance with respect to routing overhead, power consumption,
latency and PDR, which significantly shorten the network
lifetime [16].
To address this issue, we extended our previous work
in [17] in which we proposed a solution to mitigate the
aforementioned attack. This work has been extended by first
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introducing a new mitigation technique and evaluating their
efficiency compared to the unsecured version of RPL as well
as our previous solution. We have also evaluated both solu-
tions under wider simulation environments and parameters.
The obtained results have demonstrated that our proposed
solutions are very effective in mitigating the DAO attack
and can upgrade the network performance significantly with
respect to power consumption, routing overhead and the
packet delivery ratio.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
provides a brief overview of the security concepts of RPL.In
Section III, the state of art is provided. An overview
of the RPL protocol in storing mode is highlighted in
Section IV. Section V presents an overview of the DAO
attacks. Section VI presents detailed discussion of the pro-
posed countermeasure to the attacks. Section VII evaluates
the performance of a RPL network under DAO attack under
various scenarios with respect to several metrics and through
extensive simulation experiments.In section VIII the paper is
concluded.
II. SECURITY CONCEPTS OF RPL
Vulnerable components in an LLN include the routing
information that is exchanged and stored, as well as the
available resources of the nodes and the processes running
on them [17]. Routing information is exchanged in LLNs
using wireless communication at the control layer and par-
tially cached on the reprocessing nodes. The resources on the
nodes consist of their computing power, available memory,
available energy, and the bandwidth available to communi-
cate with their neighbors. The routing processes of the node
summarize services that generate and maintain routes in the
topology. Among the potential attacks in the immediate area
of the topology is the possibility to attack the RPL nodes
from a distance through the Internet. This is made possible
by the fact that RPL is designed for use on low-resource
nodes, allowing communication and interaction with nodes
from other IPv6-based networks [7], [8]. To protect against
attacks, RPL defines optional cryptographic protections that
enable secure communication using secret keys [18].
The type of RPL attacks can be categorized into two types
of attacks:
1) Topology attacks: Attacks that can be used to manip-
ulate the orientation of the paths of a DODAG
(Direction-Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph). For this
purpose, the attacker attempts to deform the DODAG
in a targeted manner, so that the paths on which mes-
sages are exchanged are directed specifically into cer-
tain sections of the DODAG or the message exchange
on the affected branches is disturbed. In the Storing
Mode of Operation (MOP), the attacker can advertise
paths to non-existent sub-DODAG nodes by tamper-
ing with DAOs, fictitious prefixes. The information
about the advertised prefixes of the DAO propagates
upward to the root of the DODAG. All parent nodes
in the relevant branch enter the advertised prefixes in
their routing tables, and potentially cannot enter and
serve sub-DODAGs of other children. Nodes whose
downward prefixes cannot be operated in the affected
branch will only be able to advertise their prefixes in
other branches if available. If the nodes migrate their
paths to the alternate parent nodes, their downward
routes are pushed out of the affected upward branch of
the attacker, resulting in a degeneration of the original
DODAG. If a child with its sub-DODAG incorrectly
joins a parent node that cannot operate the sub-DODAG
with messages in the direction of the child, the prefixes
are not advertised upward and remain unknown on the
downward path to the affected parent node [19], [20].
2) Resource Attack: Attacks that increase the energy
consumption of RPL nodes. The attacker attempts to
load a node with computationally intensive operations
and frequently consumes its memory. The motivation
behind the attacks is to weaken the performance of the
entire topology and thereby disrupt the operation in the
DODAG [21], [22].
III. RELATED WORK
The Rank authentication and Parent Failover techniques are
two schemes described in [23] that provide a solution to
Sinkhole attack. The first, relaies on the generation of one-
way hashes (which are attached to DIO messages) to provide
a mechanism for legitimate nodes to verify if another node
on the path to the sink is advertising a fake rank. In the latter,
a sink node uses an Unheard Nodes Set (UNS) field in the
DIO message to advertise a child node that (based on pre-
defined baseline) it is not sending enough traffic. When the
advertised node receives the DIO message, it adds its parent
node to a blacklist. It is noted that the hash calculation and
verification process and the extra UNS field create additional
energy consumption and traffic overhead which, however,
do not degrade the network performance in a significant
way. The two solutions together provide an efficient defence
against sinkhole attacks, but this method is proven to not work
against a combination of Sybil Attack and Sinkhole Attack
and was not targeting the DAO attack.
The authors in [24] investigated the consequences of a
Blockhole attack in RPL topology highlighting different fac-
tors which indicates the network could be under a this attack:
rate of DIO messages, packet delivery ratio and packet loss.
They also proposed a defence system which is based on a
per-node trust mechanism based on the forwarding behaviour
of neighbours node in the network. The Trust value depends
on the positive feedback awareness among the nodes and the
trust evaluation analysis. It is a fairly complicated method
which will create overhead and require additional compu-
tational power, but results from the paper prove it to be
effective.
In [6] the authors proposed a solution for the detection and
isolation of a malicious node that is attempting a Decreased
Rank attack. The Version Number and Rank Authentica-
tion (VeRA) system prevents the attacking nodes of obtaining
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false rank values through crafted advertisement, by imple-
menting a one-way hash chain method in the RPL protocol
and making sure that rank advertisements in the topology are
from legitimate nodes; this will prevent compromised nodes
from publishing an illegitimate decreased Rank to its neigh-
bours. The system is developed upon three building blocks a
Hash Function, MAC (message authentication) and a Digital
Signature function. The system is also proven to be effective
against the Version Attack, but it will inevitably create traffic
overhead and requires more computational operation, hence
degrades the overall networks performances.
The authors in [14] proposed several countermeasures
against DIO suppression attack that are more protocol ori-
ented, appending a Message Integrity Code (MIC) to the
messages as RPL specification can be effective in preventing
the DIO suppression attack. Another proposed solution is
to enable MAC-layer encryption to make it impossible for
the attacking node to distinguish DIO messages from other
messages. The latter solution will creates network traffic
overhead and will need more computational power.
A solution proposed to mitigate the Selective forwarding
attack in [7] is to create alternative path in the RPL topology
that are dynamically selected by nodes. The solution seems
feasible if we assume that there may be multiple nodes in
the DODAG with a similar link quality. However, this type
of traffic control will inevitably create some overhead in the
network. Another solution is to use encryption mechanism
to make the malicious node not distinguish different type of
traffic and therefore either forward or drop all traffic.
In [25] the authors presented different solutions to detect
and mitigate a wormhole attack. One approach is to give
geographical information to the nodes and, therefore, to the
neighbourhood. Another solution is to use separate link layer
keys for different portion of the network, resulting in the
impossibility for two nodes in different segments to commu-
nicate between each other. A more complicated approach is
to use a Merkel Tree Authentication schema for the construc-
tion of the topology. Basically, this approach makes use of
nodes IDs and public key for Hash calculation. The topology
construction starts from the leaf rather than from the sink and
a parent is identified by its children. The nodes authentication
starts from the root and if any nodes fails to authenticate,
the children discard the node as parent.
Reference [26] states that no solution has been specifi-
cally designed for HELLO Flooding attack. It shows through
a simulation how the attach will be removed in a reason-
able amount of time by the RPL Global and Local repair
mechanism.
In [27] the author proposed a dynamic threshold mech-
anism to mitiagte DAO inconsistency attack, named DTM.
With this mechanism, parent nodes could dynamically regu-
late the threshold of receiving forwarding error packets within
a period. Beside this, RPL includes an optional mechanism
that can be used to repair DAO inconsistencies called DAO
inconsistency loop recovery.
IV. RPL ROUTING PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
The RPL routing protocol provides the primary
communication pattern for multi-hop communication in
LLNs. In addition to the multipoint-to-point (MP2P) com-
munication, RPL also allows point-to-point (P2P) commu-
nication between two nodes within the topology, as well
as a point-to-multipoint (P2MP) communication in which,
the root node simultaneously transmits packets to sev-
eral node in the topology. RPL uses Directed Acyclic
Graphs (DAGs) to construct its physical topology, where
each DAG is rooted at a single destination known as a
Destination-Oriented DAG (DODAG) [3], [4].
A node sends DIO control messages to advertise its
position in the DODAG and inform the neighbor node in
its environment whether it is available as a default next-hop
node. The DIO contains the necessary information that allows
a node to join the DODAG as a participant [3]–[5]. In addi-
tion, it can determine the preference for a particular parent
node, which it uses as the preferred node to communicate
upwards towards root [3]. If the DIO sender is selected as the
new preferred parent node, the receiver node will first add the
sender address to the parent list then calculates its own rank
in the DODAG, using the information from the DIO and the
OF. It then set up a default route towards its preferred parent
and update the DIO message with the new rank. The updated
DIO message is then multicasted to the neighboring nodes to
repeat the said operation [3], [4].
In RPL DAO control messages are used to build routes
in the downward direction. DAOs propagate upwards in the
direction of the root node and include information on the
branches of a node in the downward direction. They allow you
to build routes from a node to the leaf nodes of the topology.
DAO control messages are sent when a DIO is received to
advertise which nodes the sender of a DIO can reach down-
ward. A node slightly delays the sending of DAO control mes-
sages. This allows the node to consolidate information from
one-way DAOs of the downward branches before forwarding
the information in DAOs to its parent node. Receiving a
DAO can optionally be confirmed by a DAO ACK control
message [3].
In the non-storing MOP, each node enters its prefix and
that of its parent node into the RPL Target option of a DAO
and sends it directly to the root of the DODAG. The DAO is
forwarded from each node unchanged to its parent node until
it arrives at the root. This allows the root to learn all nodes,
as well as their parent-child relationships, and generate source
routes for the downward communication with them. If the
attacker can successfully uncover the root’s routing table by
advertising fictitious prefixes, it can then block the prefixes
throughout the DODAG [3], [4].In the Storing MOP, node
sends such a manipulated DAO to their parents’ nodes. Then
the parent advertise the manipulated entered relationship
between the reachable prefixes further in their upward paths.
If a message is now sent to one of the prefixes, through the
deception the message will change direction when forwarded
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to the destination prefix and thus be forwarded inconsistently.
The nodes directly involved in the forwarding detect a local
inconsistency that reset their trickle-timer and initiate a local
repair operation [3], [4].
V. THE DAO ATTACK
DAOmessages are used in RPL networks to create the routing
paths that will carry the downward traffic from the DODAG
root to the respective nodes. The specification of RPL does
not define how often and/or when such messages are to
be transferred. Therefore, different implementations of the
protocol may opt to propagate DAOs messages differently.
For example, the implantation of RPL in [15] have chosen
to transmit DAOs periodically with a pre-specified inter-
val while they have been propagated in the Contiki RPL
implementation [28] based on the timing of DIO messages.
In Contiki RPL, a child node will usually send a DAO to its
preferred parent in three occasions: 1) after receiving a DIO
from its own parent; 2) when changing the preferred parent;
and 3) in the detection of some specific errors. A critical
issue here is that a DAO sent by a child node will lead to
the transmission of several DAOs equivalent to the number
of parents up to the DODAG root. A malicious node may
exploit this case to drain the network resources by judiciously
and repeatedly transmitting DAOmessages to its parent node.
One approach to perform this attack is by replaying a DAO
sent by a legitimate node by an outsider malicious attacker
[14]. RPL’s security services deployed by layers underneath
such as the cryptographic challenge-response handshake and
link layer encryption can be used to mitigate this attack
[14]. However, an insider attacker can easily bypass such
security mechanisms triggering the need for more efficient
solutions [14].
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In order to address the DAO insider attack in RPL, two miti-
gationmechanisms have been proposed, named SecRPL1 and
SecRPL2. These schemes need to be activated at the begin-
ning of the network operations. In SecRPL1, we restrict the
number of forwarded DAOs per child. This is achieved by
having each parent node count the number of DAOs received
from each child node in the parent sub-DODAG. Then the
parent node will stop forwarding the child’s DAOs when their
number exceeds a pre-specified threshold. Hence, during a
specific time slot, a node will forward up any received DAO
initiated by a specific child until it reaches a pre-specified
limit. When reaching that limit, no further DAOs from that
child will be forwarded until the end of that time slot. The
start and the end of time slot is controlled by the Trickle timer
of DIO messages. In other words, the length of each time slot
is equivalent to the length of DIO current interval.
To guarantee that no DAOs will be discarded due to the
time factor, we reset the DAO counter at every DIO interval
specifically, at the time a parent sends out a DIO message.
In the second scheme (SecRPL2), we restrict the entire
number of forwarded DAOs by a specific node regardless of




4: procedure DIO Transmitted
5: for Each child in the childern list do
6: child_DAO_Counter = 0
7: end for
8: end procedure
9: procedure Child’s DAO Received
10: if child_DAO_Counter < DAO_For_MAX_PerChild
then
11: forward the DAO
12: child_DAO_Counter ++
13: else
14: discard the DAO
15: end if
16: end procedure




4: procedure DIO Transmitted
5: DAO_Counter = 0
6: end procedure
7: procedure Child’s DAO Received
8: if DAO_Counter < DAO_For_MAX then
9: forward the DAO
10: DAO_Counter ++
11: else
12: discard the DAO
13: end if
14: end procedure
the child node who initiated the DAO. Hence, during a spe-
cific time slot, a node will forward up any received DAO until
it reaches a pre-specified limit (DAO_FORWARD_MAX ).
When reaching that limit, no further DAOs will be forwarded
until the end of that time slot.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we show the effect of the attack on the
performance of the network in terms of several metrics, and
to demonstrate how our proposed mechanisms can mitigate
the DAO attack. A set of experiments have been carried out
based on the well-known Contiki, the operating system for
IoT devices [28]. Contiki has implementations for IoT com-
munication stack including the standards of RPL, 6LoWPAN,
CoAP, and IPv6.
Cooja simulator [29] which emulates exactly the binary
on real IoT devices is used in our study to conduct the
experiments. This has been exploited to emulate the MSPsim
[30] of the Tmote sky platform, a well-known IoT sensor
device with a low power IEEE 802.15.4 compliant CC2420
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TABLE 1. Simulation parameters.
radio chip. The radio protocol (UDGM), Unit Disk Graph
Radio Medium, is used to simulate the propagation model.
For Link layer, we used the CSMA/CA whereas the Con-
tikiMAC was used as the radio duty cycling (RDC) proto-
col. The attack itself (i.e., DAO attack) has been implemented
based on the ContikiRPL library within Contiki operating
system. In particular, the attack was mounted by having
an insider attacker send DAO messages periodically at pre-
specified interval to its parent. The number of attackers in
our simulation is set to three nodes.
A periodic data gathering application where sensor nodes
send their readings to the DODAG root every minute was
simulated at the application laye,r where the DODAG root
sends a reply for each received message as a downward
traffic. We simulated a stationary network with 50 nodes,
the predominant pattern that you will find in a typical home
network. The nodes in our simulation were distributed uni-
formly in an area of 100m x 100m while the DODAG root
is positioned outside the deployment area. The simulation is
timed out to end in 30 minutes for each simulated scenario.
Table 1 summarizes the experimental parameters used in
our study.
The protocols evaluated for each scenario are RPL, RPL
with attack (InsecRPL), RPL under attack with first proposed
solution (SecRPL1), RPL under attack with second proposed
solution (SecRPL2). In terms of the following metrics:
1) The average number of DAO messages forwarded by
the parents in the network (Number of DAOs For-
warded).
2) The average power consumption in the network in
milliwatts (Power Consumption (mW)).
FIGURE 1. DAOs forwarding overhead vs attack intervals.
3) The Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) of the upward traffic
(i.e., from nodes to the DODAG root)
4) The PDR of downward direction (i.e., from the
DODAG root to nodes)
5) The average end-to-end delay from nodes to the
DODAG root in seconds (i.e. latency of the upward
traffic)
6) The average end-to-end delay from the DODAG root to
nodes in seconds (i.e. latency of the downward traffic)
A. THE EFFECT OF THE DAO ATTACK FREQUENCY
In the simulated scenario, three nodes located at the edge of
the deployment area farther away from the DODAG root were
selected to run as the attacker nodes as this will ensure cov-
ering the vast majority of forwarding paths, a phenomenon
that an attacker will prefer to maximize the damage in the
network. The maximum number of DAOs allowed to be
forwarded for each child by a parent is set to 10 empirically
(i.e., DAOMax threshold). The attack interval, the rate in
milliseconds at which the malicious nodes transmits DAOs,
is chosen between 250 and 10000 milliseconds. Five runs
were conducted for each simulated scenarios under different
random seeds for getting statistically solid results which are
depicted in the following graphs.
The performance of the network under the simulated
scenarios in terms of Forwarded DAO messages and under
different attacking intervals is depicted in Figure 1 where the
DAOMax threshold per child is set to ten. Figure 1 shows that
the overhead of forwarded DAOs in InsecRPL, SecRPL1 and
SecRPL2 is higher than that of normal model (i.e., RPL)
regardless of the attacking interval value. However, we can
also observe from Figure 1 that SecRPL2 has performed
better, especially under attack interval of 250 milliseconds,
in terms of DAOs overhead compared to other models apart
from normal RPL.
The same can be said in relation to the power consumption
as demonstrated in Figure 2. This better performance in terms
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FIGURE 2. Power consumption vs attack interval.
FIGURE 3. Upward latency vs attack intervals.
of overhead and power consumption is easily justified by
having the parent restricts the number of forwarded messages
per child as proposed in our mechanism. It can be observed
in Figure 2 that the insecure version of RPL has suffered
heavily in relation to average power consumption due the
attackers being able to flood the network with large amount
of DAOs with no defence mechanism in place. This has been
mitigated in both SecRPL1 and SecRPL2 applying the idea
of threshold-based security with SecRPL1 showing relatively
better performance compared to SecRPL2.
Indeed, the amount of power consumed is calculated in
Contiki by adding up the power consumed in four of states of
the nodes which are: power consumed in the listening state,
power consumed in the idle state, power consumed in the
transmission state and power consumed in the running state.
Hence, the high overhead in terms of DAOs will surely lead
FIGURE 4. Downward latency vs attack intervals.
FIGURE 5. Upward PDR vs attack intervals.
to an increase in the power consumed in the transmission
and listening states of the forwarder nodes along the path to
the DODAG root, consequently increasing the average power
consumption of the network.
The performance of the network in terms of upward
latency is shown in Figure 3, whereas upward latency is
depicted in Figure 4. Similarly, it is evident from figures
that the latency in both downward and upward traffic has
been adversely affected by the DAO attack. This again
can be attributed to high overhead at the forwarder nodes
that induces a higher congestion. In the same context, this
degradation in the network performance in terms of latency
has been mitigated by applying our mitigation mechanism
(i.e., SecRPL1 and SecRPL2) specifically under heavy
attacking intervals.
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FIGURE 6. Downward PDR vs attack intervals.
FIGURE 7. DAOs forwarding overhead vs number of attackers.
The PDRs of the upward traffic and downward traffic are
shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively. It is again
evident from both figures that the PDR in both directions
suffer heavily when running the attack under a high attack
interval. Note, however, that this may not hold true when
mounting the attack under different data rates or topologies.
This degradation can be mainly justified by the congestion
incurred due to the high overhead at the forwarder nodes
under the effect of the attack which again has been alle-
viated applying our proposed mitigation mechanisms. Both
RPLSec1 and RPLSec2 have shown comparable PDR rates in
both directions to that of the reference model. The insecure
version of RPL (i.e., InSecRPL) has experienced the worst
results in terms of PDR, with 7% lower than that of the
reference model of RPL. Both SecRPL1 and SecRPL2 have
managed to enhance the performance in terms of PDR by up
4% and 6% respectively.
FIGURE 8. Power consumption vs number of attackers.
FIGURE 9. Upward latency vs number of attackers.
B. THE EFFECT OF INCREASING THE
NUMBER OF ATTACKERS
In this scenario, the attack will be implemented by increas-
ing the number of attackers, starting with two attackers and
incrementing it by two to a maximum of 10. The value of
DAOMax threshold in all cases was fixed to 10 in both
RPLSec1 and RPLSec2.
The DAO overheads in terms of the average number of
forwarded messages per node with different attacking inter-
vals is depicted in Figure 7. The figure demonstrates that
InsecRPL have increased the DAO overhead in comparison
with SecRPL2 and RPL. In fact SecRPL1, SecRPL2 have
managed to mitigate the effect of the DAO attack, especially
in the case under ten attacking nodes with 76.36% and 205%
respectively decrease in the DAO overhead compared to the
InsecRPL.
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FIGURE 10. Downward latency vs number of attackers.
FIGURE 11. Upward PDR vs number of attackers.
The superior performance of SecRPL2 over SecRPL1 is
related to the value of the DAOMax chosen as SecRPL2 can
only forward up to 10 DAOs in total in a given interval
while SecRPL1 can forward 10 DAOs per destination, hence,
the superiority of SecRPL2 over SecRPL1. This has been
translated into a decrease in the power consumption under
the proposed schemes as depicted in Figure 8 which can
be easily justified by the capacity of secure versions of
RPL (i.e., SecRPL1 and SecRPL2) to restricted the num-
ber of forwarded DAOs per child due to the attack. Both
mitigation schemes SecRPL1 and SecRPL2 were able to
reduce the effect of the attack by 24% and 87% respectively;
however, both consumed more power than the reference
network (RPL).
Figures 9 and 10 demonstrate the latency of the upward
and downward traffic respectively for protocols under com-
parison. Similarly, it is evident that the latency has suffered
FIGURE 12. Downward PDR vs number of attackers.
FIGURE 13. DAOs forwarding under various DAO threshold.
significantly under the attack for both traffic patterns as a
result of the significant congestion at the forwarder nodes.
SecRPL1 has improved the upward latency by 65.88% and
the downward latency by 181.19%. With SecRPL2 both
upward and downward latency are greatly reduced outper-
forming SecRPL1 which can be attributed again to the DAO
threshold chosen.
The PDRs of upward and downward traffic for the four
models are depicted in Figure 11 and Figure 12 respectively.
The figures again demonstrate that the PDRs of both traffic
patterns have been affected negatively and the amount of the
affect is proportional to the number of the attackers in the net-
work, which can be attributed to the congestions experienced
by the forwarder nodes. The degradation in the PDR rate has
been overcome by the proposed solutions, in which we almost
restore the same efficiency of the reference model. From
Figure 11 and Figure 12, we can conclude that SecRPL1 has
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FIGURE 14. Power consumption under various DAO threshold.
FIGURE 15. Downward PDR under various DAO threshold.
slightly improved PDR over InsecRPL with a 2% increase.
SecRPL2, however shows an increase of 3% indicating best
performance comparable to the reference model with 3%
difference.
C. THE EFFECT OF THE THRESHOLD
PARAMETER (DAOMAX)
We also investigated the effect of the threshold value
(i.e. DAO threshold Max) on the network reliability in terms
of PDR. Intuitively, the smaller the value of the threshold,
the lower the DAO overhead and power consumption but at
the expense of network reliability. We have depicted how
setting the threshold value can affect the performance of the
network in terms of mentioned metrics in Figure 13 and
Figure 14. It is clear from Figure 13 and Figure 14 that
selecting a very small value for the threshold has reduced
the control overhead and power consumption in both mitiga-
tion mechanisms with SecRPL2 again being more efficient
FIGURE 16. Upward PDR under various DAO threshold.
FIGURE 17. Upward latency under various DAO threshold.
in overcoming the effect of the attack, reducing the DAO
overhead and the power consumption to up to 48.5% and 18%
respectively compared to SecRPL1.
However, this has impacted the PDR of the downward traf-
fic negatively as illustrated in Figure 15 and Figure 16. This
holds true for any value of the threshold less than four. This
can be explained easily by the fact that the small value of the
threshold will lead into preventing the forwarding of critical
DAO messages necessary to build more efficient downward
routing paths, hence, the lower PDR of the downward traffic.
The figures show also that SecRPL2 performs better than
SecRPL1 under both traffic patterns in terms of PDR as the
DAO threshold are only restricted partially.
Fig. 17 and 18, show the effect of both mechanisms on
downward and upward latency. It indicates that assigning
lower threshold values will reduce the latency. SecRPL2 was
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FIGURE 18. Downward latency under various DAO threshold.
able to much better overcome the effect of the attack, decreas-
ing upward and downward latency by 53.57% and 53.71%,
respectively in comparison to SecRPL1.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this study, we have evaluated the effect of the DAO
flooding attack on the network performance in terms of power
consumption, packet delivery ratio and latency under differ-
ent scenarios and operating conditions. The DAO attack can
bemounted in IoT networks by having an attacker node trans-
mitting periodically DAO messages to its preferred parent
which in turn will forward the received DAOs to its own
parent and so on until the DAOs reach the final destination
which is the DODAG root. The DAOs in the context of
the RPL protocol are transmitted in end-to-end approach
(i.e., from sensors to the sink) which makes them different
from other RPL’s flooding attacks including the DIO and
DIS attacks. Hence, not only the immediate neighbors of the
attackers will get affected and harmed by the attack, but also
all forwarding nodes to the DODAG root. In fact, an attacker
node located at the network edge and transmitting a DAO
message will prompt all other nodes in the forwarding path to
the DODAG root to forward such a message. The simulation
results have shown how the attack can damage the network
performance by significantly increasing the DAO overhead
and power consumption. The results have also demonstrated
that the DAO attack may moderately affect the reliability of
the downward traffic under specific conditions. To overcome
the effect of the attack, two mitigation mechanisms have
been proposed and evaluated showing a good capacity in
restoring the optimal performance of the network in terms of
the respective metrics.
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